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CASE
NOTES
Application of the Illinois Consumer Fraud
Act to the Attorney-Client Relationship
by Andrew Geier
I. INTRODUCTION
Many states have passed consumer
fraud acts to protect consumers from
fraudulent or deceptive practices by
merchants.' Claims under these
statutes are typically filed by
purchasers of such items as consumer
products, automobiles, or repair
services.2 Occasionally, a consumer will
bring suit against his or her attorney
under a consumer fraud act alleging
the attorney's misconduct in the
practice of law.3 Unfortunately, the
number of consumers bringing these
types of suits against their attorneys is
increasing.' Courts in Illinois have
generally struck down claims
involving attorney conduct when
brought under Illinois' Consumer
Fraud Act on the grounds that the
practice of law is not included within
the scope of the statute.- Recently,
however, an Illinois appellate court
diverted from these prior decisions
when it found that a plaintiff stated a
valid claim for attorney misconduct
under Illinois' Consumer Fraud Act.6
That court reasoned that because the
plaintiff's claim was based on an
attorney's fraudulent billing practices,
it did not directly relate to the lawyer's
professional training, and was
therefore a "business aspect" of the
practice of law and covered by Illinois'
Consumer Fraud Act.7 The Illinois
Supreme Court heard the case on
appeal where it decided, by a five-to-
one margin, that the Illinois' Consumer
Fraud Act does not govern the attorney-
client relationship; the Supreme Court
alone regulates lawyer conduct."
Part II of this Note will examine the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act9 as well as
rules governing lawyer conduct and
discipline in the state." Part I[ also will
compare alternative theories of
attorney liability for fraudulent or
deceptive practices." Finally, Part II
will trace the development of Illinois
appellate court decisions leading up to
the supreme court's decision in Cripe v.
Leiter where it held that the attorney-
client relationship is not governed by
Illinois' Consumer Fraud Act. 2 Part II
of this Note explores, in detail, the
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reasoning of the majority and dissent
in Cripe.13 Part IV analyzes the
supreme court's decision in light of the
preceding appellate court decisions,
and concludes that the supreme court
reached the correct result based on
tenets of statutory construction and the
existing regulatory scheme governing
lawyer conduct.14 Part V looks at the
impact that the Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in Cripe will have on
consumers and attorneys. 5
II. BACKGROUND
A. Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
Generally, the Illinois Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act ("Consumer Fraud Act"
or "Act") prohibits unfair or deceptive
competition or practices when used in
any trade or commerce. 6 The Illinois
legislature drafted the Act to protect
consumers and businesses from
exploitation by unscrupulous people or
businesses that use such unfair
practices for their gain.'
Consequently, the statute employs
broad language to afford consumers
this protection. 8 In fact, the protection
provided by illinois' Consumer Fraud
Act is generally regarded as being even
broader than traditional common law
actions of fraud or negligent
misrepresentation.19
As a result, consumers who believe
they have been victimized by fraud
will generally turn to a state's
consumer fraud act as their first source
for relief.20 This is primarily due to the
types of damage awards available.2'
Under the Act, a successful plaintiff
may recover economic and punitive
damages from the defendant or may
obtain injunctive relief.22 In addition, a
court may award attorneys' fees and
court costs under the Act.23 Although
attorney's fees and court costs are
awarded at the judge's discretion, most
judges award the prevailing plaintiffs
these amounts because of the small
dollar amounts often involved in
consumer disputes.24 Awards of costs
and fees provide the consumer with an
incentive to bring a meritous suit he or
she might not otherwise have brought
for fear of losing money on attorneys'
fees. 25
B. Regulation of Attorney Conduct
The Illinois Supreme Court is the
traditional regulator of attorney
conduct.26 The supreme court has the
exclusive power to control admission
to the bar in Illinois and to discipline
any unprofessional conduct of
attorneys who are already admitted.27
Accordingly, the supreme court has
created a comprehensive system to
regulate attorneys and punish attorney
misconduct.28 This includes the
adoption of the Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct, the appointment
of an Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission (ARDC), and
the creation of a procedural framework
to assist the ARDC. 29 There are now a
variety of sources for regulation of
attorney conduct, including the Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct, the
Rules of the ARDC, ARDC Supreme
Court Rules, and Bar Admission
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Rules °
Attorney billing practices are also
governed by the supreme court's
regulatory power.3' In addition, the
attorney billing practice is an area that
has become increasingly subject to
scrutiny by clients who believe that
their attorney's bill was unreasonable. 32
While fraudulent billing is apparently
a common problem among attorneys, 33
there are a limited amount of court
decisions concerning ethics in billing.34
When an attorney's fraudulent billing
practices have been proven, however,
courts have demonstrated a
willingness to impose sanctions on the
attorney.31 In many cases, the
reasonableness of the fee charged is of
primary importance, and is the key
element that the attorney must prove. 6
Therefore, although arguably a
commercial aspect of the practice of
law, attorney billing practices are
nonetheless a controversial and
important part of a lawyer's practice
and are thoroughly regulated by the
Illinois Supreme Court.
C. Attorney Liability: Consumer
Protection Statutes or Common Law
Theories
A plaintiff, if allowed a choice,
would probably prefer to sue his
allegedly dishonest or unscrupulous
attorney under a state's consumer
protection statute than under a
common-law theory such as legal
malpractice.37 This is because a state's
consumer protection statute is
generally a much more plaintiff-
friendly cause of action than a
common-law theory of fraud or legal
malpractice. 3 Under a consumer
protection statute the plaintiff typically
carries a lighter burden of proof.39 A
plaintiff bringing suit under a typical
consumer fraud statute will not have to
prove the underlying claim. ° For
instance, a plaintiff bringing suit
against an attorney under a consumer
fraud statute based on the attorney's
mishandling of a medical malpractice
claim, would not need to prove that the
underlying malpractice claim would
have been successful.41 Rather, the
plaintiff need only prove that the
attorney acted unconscionably
according to the consumer fraud
statute, which is typically much easier
to establish.42 Another reason that
consumer fraud acts are more
attractive to plaintiffs is, as discussed
above, that punitive damages and
attorneys' fees are generally more
readily available under these statutes
than under common law causes of
action 3
D. Attorney Liability Under the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
Although nationally few courts
have considered consumer fraud
complaints against lawyers, some
Illinois courts have addressed this
issue." In Frahm v. Urkovich,45 the
plaintiffs sued the defendant attorney
under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
for damages they incurred as a result
of the attorney's misrepresentation and
withholding of certain facts relevant to
a real estate transaction. 6 The court
found that the Act was inapplicable
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because the plaintiffs did not fall
within the class of "consumers" the
statute was designed to protect.47 The
court explained that interpreting the
Act as applying to the provision of
legal services "would necessarily
equate the practice of law with an
ordinary commercial enterprise, a
proposition for which [it found] no
support in case law or public policy."48
The court concluded therefore that the
terms "trade or commerce" as used in
the Act were not meant to include "the
actual practice of law," rather they
were only intended to include those
unfair practices that affect consumers
generally.49
In two subsequent decisions,
Illinois appellate courts agreed with
the holding in Frahm, and determined
that the Act did not apply to the
provision of legal services. In Guess v.
Brophy,5° the court briefly commented
on the applicability of the Consumer
Fraud Act to attorney conduct, stating
"we are confident that the legislature
did not intend to include the
furnishing of legal services to clients
within the Act.""' In Lurz v. Panek,52 the
court addressed the issue at greater
length. In Lurz, the plaintiff sued the
attorneys who had represented him
and obtained a judgment in his favor.53
The plaintiff's Consumer Fraud Act
claim was based on the attorney's
misconduct in disbursing the judgment
to him.s4 He sought damages under
Illinois' Consumer Fraud Act arguing
that his claim involved the business or
"entrepreneurial" aspects of the
practice of law, and it therefore fell
within the scope of the Act. s The Lurz
court disagreed, however, and, relying
on the precedent set in Frahm,
concluded that the defendant's conduct
did not fall within the scope of the
Act.s6
III. DISCUSSION
A. Cripe v. Leiter
In Cripe v. Leiter,7 the Ilinois
Supreme Court, in a case of first
impression, considered whether the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act applied to
an attorney who allegedly overbilled
his client.-8 In the prior proceedings,
the circuit court, based on the Frahm
decision, dismissed the plaintiff's
Consumer Fraud Act claim ruling that
the Act covers neither the provision of
legal services nor the billing for those
services.59 The appellate court,
however, reversed the judgment of the
circuit court.6° The appellate court
agreed with the plaintiff's assertion
that the alleged overbilling by the
defendant did not involve the actual
practice of law, but rather fell within
the commercial aspects of the practice
of law and was therefore subject to
regulation under Illinois' Consumer
Fraud Act.61 The appellate court
concluded that the legal profession
should not be given a blanket
exemption from the Act, stating that
"business aspects" of the practice of
law are subject to the Consumer Fraud
Act.62
In Cripe, the defendant, Thomas
Leiter, was an attorney who was
retained by Roberta Schmitz to
represent her in the transfer of two
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trusts.63 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff,
Mrs. Schmitz's daughter, filed a
petition for appointment of guardian
based on Mrs. Schmitz's incapacity.'
Mrs. Schmitz was found to be
incapacitated, and the plaintiff was
appointed as her guardian.' The
plaintiff, in her capacity as Mrs.
Schmitz's guardian, fied suit against
Leiter, alleging that Leiter overcharged
her mother $40,000.00 in legal fees, and
that the fees charged were
"outrageously excessive and
unreasonable and bear no relationship
to the actual time spent by... Leiter in
representing Mrs. Schmitz."'
The Illinois Supreme Court
considered only the Consumer Fraud
Act counts of the plaintiff's complaint
when it heard Leiter's appeal.67 In his
defense, Leiter argued that the
Consumer Fraud Act did not apply to
any claims arising out of the provision
of legal services, and that his allegedly
excessive bill was a part of those
services.61 The plaintiff countered that
only claims arising from the practice of
law are exempt from the Act and that
Leiter's billing for his legal services
was a business aspect of the legal
profession so it should be subject to the
Act.69 The supreme court, with one
Justice dissenting, held that, "where
allegations of misconduct arise from a
defendant's conduct in his or her
capacity as an attorney representing a
client, the Consumer Fraud Act does
not apply."70 It went on to state that an
attorney's billing of the client for the
attorney's legal services is part of his
representation of that client, and
therefore the Illinois Consumer Fraud
Act is inapplicable.7'
B. Majority Opinion
The majority considered several
issues in reaching its conclusion. It
first noted that the Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act does not contain any
language that expressly includes or
excludes attorneys from its scope.72
However, according to the majority, the
case law7 on the subject dearly
indicated that consumer fraud acts do
not apply to claims that arise from "the
actual practice of law."74 The question
was therefore whether billing for legal
services constituted the practice of law,
and, if not, should be exempt from the
Act.75 Based on an historical analysis
of the supreme court's regulation of
attorneys, the majority concluded that
the legislature did not intend the
Consumer Fraud Act to apply to any
aspect of the practice of law, including
attorney billing practices.76
Next, the majority noted that,
unlike the merchant-consumer
relationship, the attorney-client
relationship is already heavily
regulated. 77 It explained that the
supreme court has extensive powers
over attorney conduct including the
power to punish "an attorney who
engages in fraud, dishonesty, deceit, or
misrepresentation." 78 The supreme
court's regulatory powers also include
the area of attorneys' fees as provided
by Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.79 Specifically, the court may
discipline and sanction attorneys who
charge or collect excessive fees in
violation of the rules.w0 Further, the
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majority explained, there is an existing
client protection program sponsored by
the ARDC that was created to
reimburse a client for losses he or she
incurred in the course of the attorney-
client relationship.81 The majority
concluded that, given the already
extensive regulation of the attorney-
client relationship, had the Illinois
legislature intended the Consumer
Fraud Act to apply to the attorney-
client relationship, it would have
expressly stated so.82
Third, the majority noted that its
decision was consistent with prior
appellate court decisions beginning
with Frahm v. Urkovich.83 It explained
that the Consumer Fraud Act had been
amended many times since the Frahm,
Guess, and Lurz decisions, and that the
legislature was presumably aware of
these decisions interpreting the Act 4
Therefore, if the legislature had
intended that the Act apply to the
attorney-client relationship, it would
have amended it to include language
expressly encompassing the conduct of
attorneys when dealing with their
clients.
Finally, the majority rejected the
plaintiff's distinction between a
"business aspect" of the practice of law
and the practice of law in general. 6 It
stated that "an attorney's billing for
legal services cannot be separated from
the attorney-client relationship." 87
Further, the court noted that the
attorney-client relationship is fiduciary
in nature and the attorney's position as
a fiduciary prevents him from charging
his client fees that are excessive.8 This
fiduciary relationship is unlike the
merchant-consumer relationship where
the merchant does not owe the
consumer a duty not to charge
excessive fees or prices.8 9
Consequently, according to the
majority, overcharging a client is more
than a business aspect of the practice of
law, it is a breach of fiduciary duty for
which the attorney may be subject to
sanction. 0
C. Dissenting Opinion
The dissent argued that the
defendant's alleged billing fraud
should fall within the purview of
Illinois' Consumer Fraud Act.91 In his
dissent, Justice Harrison, the only
dissenting Justice, stated that as a
matter of statutory construction, "the
best indication of the legislature's
intent is the language it employed in
drafting the law."92 He stated that the
language of the Act "dearly and
unambiguously" embraced the
overbilling with which the defendant
was charged and therefore the plaintiff
should be entitled to any remedies
available under the Act. 3 Justice
Harrison stated that if attorneys were
intended to be excluded from the scope
of the Consumer Fraud Act, they
would have been included among the
other occupations that were expressly
excluded by the language of the
statute.94 The failure of the legislature
to specifically exclude attorneys, while
listing other excluded occupations,
indicated that attorneys' fraudulent
acts were meant to fall within the scope
of the Act.95
Justice Harrison also argued that, as
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a practical matter, application of the
principles embodied by the Consumer
Fraud Act to the practice of law would
have only beneficial effects on the
practice of law.96 He stated that there
was no harm in holding attorneys to
the standards of honesty and fair
dealing to which other business people
must adhere.97 In addition, Justice
Harrison believed that although
attorney conduct was traditionally
regulated by the supreme court, the
text of Illinois' Consumer Fraud Act
provided for any duplicative or
conflicting regulation by exempting
fraudulent acts that were already being
regulated by government authority.98
This, he believed, would protect
attorney conduct that, while actionable
under the Consumer Fraud Act, was
permissible under supreme court
rules.99 In this case, however, the
defendant's overbilling was not
permissible under the Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct.1°° Therefore, he
believed that the defendant should be
subject to sanction under both the
Rules of Professional Conduct and the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.1 1
IV. ANALYSIS
As the supreme court properly
decided, the Illinois Consumer Fraud
Act should not be applied to the
attorney-client relationship. This is
true for a number of reasons.
First, the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in Cripe was consistent with
prior appellate court decisions
interpreting the Consumer Fraud Act's
application to attorney conduct. The
Frahm, Guess, and Lurz courts, in a
series of decisions dating back fifteen
years, had determined that the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to
attorneys engaged in the practice of
law.2 For instance, in dismissing the
plaintiff's consumer fraud claim, the
Frahm court stated:
In essence, plaintiffs seek a broad
interpretation of the [Consumer
Fraud] Act which would impose
statutory liability for misconduct
amounting to professional
malpractice. We do not believe,
however, that even the most
liberal statutory interpretation
indicates the application of this
consumer protection statute to the
conduct of an attorney engaged in
the actual practice of law .. '13
The Cripe court agreed with the
sound reasoning of the appellate courts
in reaching its decision, and went on to
reject any distinction between a
"business aspect" of the practice of law,
and the "actual practice of law." °4
Second, the attorney-client
relationship, unlike the merchant-
consumer relationship, is already
heavily regulated.1°5 The legislature,
recognizing that the Consumer Fraud
Act might overlap with other
regulatory schemes, exempted from its
scope any "[a]ctions or transactions
specifically authorized by laws
administered by any regulatory body
or officer acting under statutory
authority of this State or the United
States."'1 6 Although the attorney-client
relationship is not expressly exempted
by the Act, it arguably includes the
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types of "actions or transactions"
referenced in this provision since
attorney conduct is regulated by the
supreme court through the ARDC. °7
Moreover, as the majority in Cripe
noted, Rule 1.5 of the Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct expressly
regulates the area of attorneys' fees.Y8
Therefore, a distinction between a
"business aspect" of the practice of law
and the actual practice of law is
unnecessary, since an attorney is
already subject to sanction for charging
an unreasonable fee.
Third, the attorney-client
relationship, unlike the merchant-
consumer relationship, is fiduciary in
nature. 1' 9 An attorney's breach of his
fiduciary duty to the client, including a
breach caused by excessive billing,
subjects the attorney to sanction by the
supreme court."0 The ordinary
merchant is not guided by a fiduciary
responsibility to his customer; rather, a
state's consumer protection statute
provides the source of guidance for the
merchant in his relationship with a
consumer. Because of the attorney's
fiduciary obligation to his client,
specifically his duty not to charge
excessive fees, an attorney's bill is more
than simply a business aspect of the
practice of law."' It is an inseparable
part of the attorney-client relationship.
Finally, the language of the statute
was not meant to apply to attorney
conduct. As stated above, the
inapplicability of Illinois' Consumer
Fraud Act to attorney conduct is
evident because of its exemption for
actions or transactions that are already
regulated." 2 The Act's inapplicability
is further evidenced by the legislature's
failure to amend the Act following the
Frahm, Guess, and Lurz decisions. The
legislature, in amending the Act, did
not incorporate any specific reference
to the conduct of attorneys toward
their clients. Therefore, it is assumed
that the legislature wanted the Act to
be interpreted as it had been
interpreted in the past."3 As the
majority in Cripe stated, "[tihe
legislature's failure to alter the Act in
response to these appellate court
holdings provides.., support for our
conclusion that the legislature did not
intend the Act to apply to claims
arising out of the attorney-client
relationship."14
V. IMPACT
Although prior appellate decisions
had called into question the
applicability of the Illinois Consumer
Fraud Act to attorney conduct, the
supreme court's decision in Cripe
effectively closed the door on Illinois
plaintiffs looking to bring suit against
their attorneys for acts arising out the
attorney's practice of law. Probably the
most important impact of the supreme
court's holding will be to limit a
dissatisfied client's ability to recover
costs, attorney's fees, and punitive
damages from his attorney."5 As
discussed above, these types of awards
were important to dissatisfied plaintiffs
because they are more readily available
under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
than under a traditional legal
malpractice claim." 6 The court's
decision that the Act did not apply to
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the attorney-client relationship
effectively eliminated this option for
Illinois plaintiffs. Plaintiffs may still
bring suit against an attorneys for
dishonest or fraudulent conduct on
more traditional grounds such as fraud
or legal malpractice.1 7 Unfortunately
for plaintiffs, however, costs, attorneys'
fees, and punitive damages may be
difficult or impossible to get under
these theories."8
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, the Illinois Supreme
Court remains the sole regulator of
attorney conduct in Illinois. Illinois'
Consumer Fraud Act is not applicable
to the attorney-client relationship when
the plaintiff's claim arises out of the
attorney's practice of law. An
attorney's billing practices are a part of
the attorney's practice of law, and
therefore the Act is equally
inapplicable to a claim of overbilling.
Accordingly, Illinois plaintiffs who
believe that they were defrauded or
deceived at the hands of their attorney
may not turn to the Consumer Fraud
Act for redress, but must instead look
to common law theories such as fraud
or legal malpractice for a remedy.
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was subject to antitrust laws. See id. The court
noted that even the Goldfarb Court stated that
the practice of law is "not interchangeable with
other business activity." See id. (quoting
Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788-89).
49 See id. at 1011.
50 Guess v. Brophy, 517 N.E.2d 693 (111.
App. Ct. 1987).
51 Id. at 696.
52 527 N.E.2d 663 (II. App. Ct. 1988).
53 See id. at 665-66.
54 See id.
ss See id. at 669. The plaintiff distinguished
between "the actual practice of law" and the
"entrepreneurial" aspects of the profession. See
id. In doing so, the plaintiff relied on a
Washington Supreme Court decision, Short v.
Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163 (Wash. 1984), in which
that court made a similar distinction. See id.
The Washington Supreme Court in Short ruled
that the state's consumer protection statute
applied to certain "entrepreneurial aspects of
the practice of law" which included "how the
price of legal services is determined, billed,
and collected.... ." Short, 691 P.2d at 168. Other
jurisdictions have have reached differing
conclusions in their consideration of this issue.
See, e.g., Rousseau v. Eshleman, 519 A.2d 243,
245 (N.H. 1986) (holding that the practice of
law is exempt from New Hampshire's
consumer protection statute); Vort v. Hollander,
607 A.2d 1339, 1342 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1992) (holding that the New Jersey consumer
protection statute does not apply to attorney's
services); but see Heslin v. Connecticut Law
Clinic, 461 A.2d 938, 943 (Conn. 1983) (holding
that the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
did not provide lawyers with a blanket
exemption and did not "totally exclude all
conduct of the profession of law"); Latham v.
Castillo, 972 S.W.2d 66,69 (Tex. 1998) (finding
that Texas' Deceptive Trade Practices Act can
apply to an attorneys' misrepresentations to his
client).
.% See Lurz, 527 N.E.2d at 670.
57 703 N.E.2d 100 (M11. 998).
58 See Cripe, 703 N.E.2d at 101.
59 See Cripe, 683 N.E.2d 514,515 (I. App.
Ct. 1997).
60 See id. at 516.
61 See id. The appellate court relied on a
federal district court's interpretation in Gadson
v Newman, in which the Gadson court stated,
"[wie... interpret Frahm to mean that 'practice
of law' exception includes activities directly
related to the lawyer's professional training or
where the lawyer is already subject to
regulation from his or her professional
organizations." See id. (quoting Gadson v.
Newman, 807 F.Supp. 1412, 1417 (C.D. M.
1992)). The Gadson court went on to state that
the determination of a fee schedule was not
"the practice of law," but was a "business
aspect" of the law which was subject to
regulation. See id. (quoting Gadson, 807 F.Supp.
at 1417).
Q2 See id. The appellate court followed the
Gadson court's reasoning in reaching its
conclusion. See id. The appellate court also
noted that, "[a]lthough the Act specifically
excludes agents of the media and real estate
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brokers from its provisions, it does not provide
an exemption for the legal profession." See id.
(citation omitted).
&3 See Cripe, 703 N.E.2d at 102.
64 See id. Mrs. Schmitz retained Leiter to
defend her in the guardianship proceeding. See
id.
6 See id. The original petition was
dismissed and Mrs. Cripe was appointed
guardian in a subsequent hearing. See id.
66 Id. The plaintiff's complaint made six
allegations: (1) violation of the Consumer
Fraud Act; (2) common law fraud; (3) breach of
fiduciary duty; (4) legal malpractice; (5)
constructive fraud; and (6) violation of the
Consumer Fraud Act by the Leiter Group,
which was the firm in which Leiter was
partner. See id. at 102-03.
67 See id. at 102.
68 See id. at 103.
69 See id.
70 See id. at 107.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 105 (comparing the Illinois
Consumer Fraud Act with similar acts from
other jurisdictions and noting that none
contain express reference to the legal
profession).
73 The majority examined lilinois appellate
court decisions as well as decisions of courts in
other jurisdictions that have considered the
issue. See id. at 104.
74 See id at 105. The plaintiff conceded that
the Act does not apply to the "actual practice of
law." See id. The plaintiff, however,
distinguished between the practice of law and
"business aspects" of that practice. See id.
See id.
76 See id. at 106.
77 See id.
78 Id.
79 See id. at 105-06 (citing Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5, 134 Ill.2d R.
1.5(a)). See also McKnight, supra note 30.
80 See Cripe, 703 N.E.2d at 106.
81 See id.
82 See id. The court stated that, absent the
legislature's clear intent to the contrary, it
would not regulate the attorney-client
relationship through the Consumer Fraud Act.
See id.
83 See id.; see also Frahm v. Urkovich
discussed supra in Part II.D.
8 See Cripe, 703 N.E.2d at 106.
95 See id. The majority stated that, when
amending a statute, "the legislature is
presumed to know the construction the statute
has been given and, by re-enactment, is
assumed to have intended for the new statute
to have the same effect." See id. (quoting Susler
v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 591 N.E.2d
427, 429 (111. 1992). The court stated that the
legislature's failure to modify the language of
the Consumer Fraud Act so that it specifically
referred to the attorney-client relationship
evidenced its intent that the Act not apply to
that relationship. See id. at 106-07.
8 See id. at 107.
87 Id.
See id.
See id.
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90 See id. The majority stated that "because
of that fiduciary relationship, the attorney's
fees are subject to scrutiny and regulation not
applicable to the fees for most commercial
regulation." See id.
91 See id. at 108 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 107 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
93 See id. at 108 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
Justice Harrison argued that the majority need
not resort to any tools of statutory
interpretation beyond the plain language of the
Act because the Act's language is
unambiguous. See id. at 107. Accordingly, he
stated that the only way that the majority
could hold that the defendant's overbilling did
not fall within the scope of the Act would be to
hold that "the legislature did not mean what
the language of the statute says." Id. at 108.
94 See id. at 108 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
The Act provides: "Nothing in this Act shall
apply to the following...[alcts done by the
publisher, owner, agent, or employee of a
newspaper, periodical or radio or television
station.... The communication of any false,
misleading or deceptive information, provided
by... a real estate salesman or broker." 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 505/10b (West 1993).
95 See Cripe, 703 N.E.2d at 108 (Harrison, J.,
dissenting). The dissent referred to the
principle of statutory construction expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, which means that
the legislature's expression of certain
exclusions in the Act is the exclusion of all
others. See id.
% See id. at 108 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
97 See id. (Harrison, J., dissenting).
9 See id. (Harrison, J., dissenting) (citing
815 ILL. Coup. STAr. 505/10b(1) (West 1992)
which provides, in pertinent part that "nothing
in the Act shall apply to [aictions or
transactions specifically authorized by laws
administered by any regulatory body or officer
acting under statutory authority of this State or
the United States .... ).
99 See id. (Harrison, J., dissenting).
100 See id. (Harrison, J., dissenting).
101 See id. (Harrison, J., dissenting). Justice
Harrison stated that,
[ajlthough the attorneys involved might
ultimately be subject to discipline, that is
no reason to deny plaintiff her right to
bring a statutory damage action against
them. If what the attorneys did constituted
a crime, we would surely not say that they
are exempt from prosecution merely
because they are subject to disbarment by
us. The same principle applies here. Id.
102 See Frahm v. Urkovich, 447 N.E.2d 1007
(IM. App. Ct. 1983); Guess v. Brophy, 517 N.E.2d
693 (IMI. App. Ct. 1987); Lurz v. Panek, 527
N.E.2d 663 (IM. App. Ct. 1988).
103 Frahm, 447 N.E.2d at 1009.
104 See Cripe, 703 N.E.2d at 107.
105 See id. at 106.
106 815 ILL. COP. STAT. 505/10b (West 1992).
107 The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in
Rousseau v. Eshleman, acknowledged that the
state's consumer protection statute did not
contain any language expressly exempting
"law, medicine, or other learned professions
from its reach." Rousseau v. Eshleman, 519
A.2d 243,245 (N.H. 1986). However, that court
interpreted statutory language that exempted
"[tirade or commerce otherwise permitted
under laws as administered by any regulatory
board or officer acting under statutory
authority of this state or of the United States"
to refer to the New Hampshire Supreme
Court's professional conduct committee. See
id. The court therefore decided that attorneys
were exempted from the state's consumer
protection statute. See id.
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108 See ILUNOIS RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDucr Rule 1.5 (West 1998).
109 See Cripe, 703 N.E.2d at 107.
110 See id.
111 See id.
112 See 815 ILL. COvN. STAT. . 505/10b(1) (West
1992).
113 See Cripe, 703 N.E.2d at 106 (citing Sulser
v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 591 N.E.2d 427,429
(M. 1992)).
114 Id. at 106-07.
115 See Gibeaut, supra note 20 at 34.
116 See supra Part II.A.
117 See supra Part II.A.
118 See Gibeaut, supra note 20 at 35.
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